Simulation test beds serve as a cost-effective and safe way to evaluate the system performance of various real world systems. With the rising concerns in the security of sensitive and critical systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), a software simulation test bed is clearly the best choice given that the environment and various system components are modeled correctly. This becomes critical given the recently developed autonomous aerial vehicles. We therefore evaluate several available simulation test beds and use the most promising test bed to analyze the impact of Global Positioning System (GPS)-related attacks on navigation of UAVs. We also introduce a novel technique for GPS spoofing, attack detection, and mitigation. This paper presents GPS spoofing and GPS jamming attacks with their anatomy, design, and impact evaluation on navigation as well as a novel GPS spoofing mitigation and detection technique for UAVs, using UAVSim: an open source simulation test bed.
Introduction
With the augmentation in application areas of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the usage has increased at an exponential rate from the military hangars to personal garages. Use of UAVs in fields such as ecology, 1 human-machine interaction evaluation, 2 etc., has also increased, even when such systems are not fully integrated with US National Airspace (NAS) and not effectively regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). It is also known that the FAA has given Certificates of Authorization (COAs) to over 75 public entities for flying drones in public airspace for monitoring, public safety, research, and other activities. 3 As per another regulation, Section 333, the FAA has allowed more than 4000 entities to fly drones for their businesses. 4 For hobbyists, the FAA has now mandated to apply for a US$5 registration and has implemented several new rules to fly drones in different setups. 5 In the recent past, UAVs have been increasingly used for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and the plan to expand their usage for pizza and package delivery within the USA is not at all a surprise. While most defense agencies are focusing on capacity augmentation and increased autonomy, there is yet little focus on the cyber-security of these vehicles. Increased attack attempts in the recent past on such mobile cyber-physical systems (CPSs) 6, 7 are alarming and have raised concerns over their use, especially with the increasing autonomy level among UAVs. 8 Keeping this in mind, the authors noticed the need for a cost-effective and safe virtual simulation environment for testing the accuracy of various security measures in an UAV communication network. Such an environment would help to safely demonstrate the possible catastrophic damages caused by the exploitation of security vulnerabilities. For example, evaluating the effects of various environment variations, such as the weather and loss of connectivity, and contested/congested communication is another important feature of such a simulation test bed. Clearly, a complete system would involve the simulation of other systems, which is critical to UAV operations, such as the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), to enable overall system security modeling and analysis. 9 In line with these requirements, we focus on (i) the implementation of the GNSS for security studies, and (ii) the implementation of Global Positioning System (GPS)-related attacks, in order to evaluate their impact on navigation. The rest of the paper is divided into six sections. The first section discusses various related works, as well as a few GPSrelated attack demonstrations in an academic setup. The second section briefly introduces the design and implementation of our simulation test bed and the newly added modules from GNSSim. It also describes the anatomy, design, and implementation of GPS-related attacks in our simulation test bed. Section 3 discusses the design and implementation of the testbed. Section 4 presents various simulation results for scenarios related to these attacks and their impact evaluation. Sections 5 and 6 present the details of our novel and fast implementation of a popular GPS anti-spoofing technique and related results for an UAV that is moving linearly. Finally, we conclude the paper in the last section and discuss possible enhancements to this work.
Related work
This section discusses previous works in the area of simulation and testing of communicating UAVs with or without GPS. Out of these, many focus on modeling of a single UAV in a controlled environment, primarily targeted at system performance, flight range, and usability improvement. Most of these works have not implemented cyberattacks or evaluated their impact on the navigation of such communicating UAVs. An ideal simulation test bed should allow inter-and intra-component communication as well as component-level analysis. Some of these works implement navigation using a GPS receiver or a software simulator to generate Position, Velocity, and Time (PVT) data. None of the works in the public domain were found to have implemented an independently working GNSS. We present a classification of these simulators based on the presence of a GNSS implementation. In addition, we also discuss (i) some of the available UAV-independent GNSS implementations that can be used in our research and (ii) some GPS spoofing demonstrations by academic researchers, in order to strengthen our claim that the threat is real.
Independent GPS simulation
In academia, there are very few software-based GPS simulators, with the Fortran77-based SiGOG (Simulated GPS Observations Generator) being the most evident. 10 Several works have been done in the industry to simulate the GNSS. LabSat simulator 11 provides the option of selecting from different GNSSs, such as GPS, GLONASS, Beidou, and Galileo. It records a genuine navigation signal that can be replayed for use in different applications. It has the limitation of being quite expensive. CNI OS3 (Open Source Satellite Simulator) is another satellite simulator, which is based on OMNeT++, and it also proposes an accurate satellite mobility model but fails to demonstrate implementation of GPS. 12 
UAV simulators without simulated GPS
Several UAV simulators do not implement or use GPS. Many works have used actual GPS receivers to obtain attitude and positional measurement instead of implementing it. [13] [14] [15] Some software-based network simulators were developed for UAV swarms and involved the use of laptops, real UAVs, or other hardware imitating an UAV; thus, they did not require any GPS implementation. 16, 17 Two other important simulation test beds for UAV swarms are SPEEDES (Synchronous Parallel Environment for Emulation and Discrete Event Simulation) 18 and C3UV (Center for Collaborative Control of Unmanned Vehicles). 19 SPEEDES simulates a swarm of UAVs on a high-performance parallel computer to match the actual speed and communication rate of an UAV network, and C3UV focuses on the fact that information acquisition through collaborative sensing and control are highly coupled. C3UV is graphical user interface (GUI) based and uses Piccolo II autopilot equipped UAVs. Clearly, these did not need any simulated GPS either, and they were proprietary in nature.
UAV simulators with simulated GPS
Visual flight simulators based on MATLAB, Simulink, and FlightGear used the navigation module of FlightGear. 7, 20 FlightGear provides generic GPS support without any signal reception model or GPS receivers. 21 Another Java-based work, UAV Playground, used FlightGear to receive real GPS data and implemented GPS tracking using Google Earth. 22 Our previous work 23 solely focused on security simulation and attacked the impact analysis of UAV networks, implementing common cyberattacks like Jamming and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Termed UAVS-ism, this open source simulation framework is based on OMNeT++ and possesses several features, including an interactive GUI for regular users, various simulation modes, and concurrent multi-user support. The test bed performance analysis in different scenarios for different modes of operations has also been presented, which advocates its performance in a generic computing environment. 24 This test bed was further enhanced with an independent GNSS simulation module, GNSSim, 25, 26 which used CNI OS3 by implementing a generic satellite constellation-based positioning application, that is, a GNSS. This feature allows GNSSim to simulate GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, and Galileo satellite systems through minor variations in configuration files. Compared to other test beds, this test bed provides flexibility to users for simulation regarding variation in parameters. Thus, it becomes the ideal choice for our attack analysis and evaluation. GNSSim also exhibits high compatibility with different types of wireless network(s) using GPS, such as a ground vehicular network.
GPS spoofing demonstration
GPS spoofing vulnerability has already been demonstrated by a team at the University of Texas at Austin in 2012 and 2013. Firstly,an UAV and then an US$80 million yacht were moved away from their respective courses in two separate works. 27, 28 Another work proved how easily a civil GPS receiver could be spoofed. 29, 30 This is a clear indication of how insecure GPS signals are and that there is a need to test the robustness of GPS receivers. Undoubtedly, the easiest way to ensure this would be to design an accurate simulated GPS that can be used to test GPS receivers.
Problem statement
This work focuses on the analysis of cyber-attacks that could affect the normal functioning of a GPS receiver, and as a result, pose various threats to the overall UAV system. To this end, we intend to use an existing open source simulation test bed, which enables users/designers of UAV systems to implement and test existing/new designs and modules. This simulator should allow testing and verification and validation (V&V) of UAV systems before deployment and, hence, save resources regarding effort, time, and money. It should also help in determining design flaws, vulnerabilities, and impacts of their presence in case of attacks. In order to achieve this overall goal, the test bed should be as close to real as possible. As mentioned Section 2, UAVSim is one of the ideal candidates for such work. In addition, the paper presents a novel implementation of a well-known GPS anti-spoofing algorithm for attack detection and mitigation on our integrated simulation test beds. As mentioned earlier, GNSSim was developed to enhance the UAV test bed with GPS capabilities along with the use of mission control centers and path planning algorithms.
Design and implementation 3.1. Architecture
Our previously designed open source simulation test bed was designed using OMNeT++ v4.5 as the base simulation engine. In addition, INET v2.99 is used for wireless mobility and related protocols. Further, for a correct satellite constellation, as well as mobility and navigation implementation, we used another open source simulation framework, GNSSim, which is based on CNI OS3 v1.1. This test bed consists of five major modules, as shown in the Figure 1 . The figure shows various modules and the placement of the test bed in the overall OMNeT++ stack. The UAV model shown in the top left-hand corner of the figure was originally presented in our previous work 6 and contained six modules. We refined this model further to summarize a few components in four major modules, as shown in the figure. The figure also shows our addition to this simulation framework-a refined satellite model with communication capabilities and a navigation application in the satellite and the UAV, which comes from GNSSim. In this section, we will briefly discuss these new additions to the UAVSim simulation test bed framework 25 The anatomy and implementation of the two GPS-specific attacks introduced in the attack library will also be discussed.
Satellite model
This newly added model has various required features for GNSS implementation. Each satellite is created using the basic satellite model defined in CNI OS3.Each satellite uses Two Line Element (TLE) data, which is a standardformat data set defined by NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), which describes the orbits of all satellites. It should be noted that CNI OS3 does not provide any communication-or navigation-related capability within satellites, and, therefore, we added these functionalities to the satellite model. We briefly discuss each of these components, including existing mobility components.
Satellite communication.
In this component, we defined the communication stack for satellites. We modified the existing satellite model to make it communication capable. Various libraries from INET and OMNeT++ were used to implement this module. Various new parameters that could be modified by the user were defined in this model, such as transmission power, the number of differential GPS stations (access points), data burst duration, and data burst gaps. Navigation functionality has been added to the satellite model through the development of a connectionless, no-reply broadcast application that sends position information to the receivers through radio signals of the L1 frequency range as per the standard GPS implementation. On the host side, the GPS application acts as a receiver, which, if enabled, allows it to receive satellite navigation signals carrying position information. The information from four or more satellites is required to calculate the position of the UAV using multi-lateration in the three-dimensional (3D) space.
3.2.2
Packet structure and functioning. The space segment constitutes GPS satellites, whereas the user segment in this scenario would be UAV hosts. The GPS application in the satellites creates and broadcasts packet frames. The host application receives the packets from the satellites and processes them for localization. The communication between UAVs and satellites or any GPS receiver is unidirectional, from satellites to the host. Satellites broadcast signals without waiting for any acknowledgment, and that is why a connectionless broadcasting protocol was used. Each satellite is identified by its index, which is from 0 to 31 (for the US GPS constellation). A packet contains four specific values: the satellite index, the X-and Y-coordinates of the satellite sending the packet, and the distance from the host receiving the packet. When an UAV receives the packet for the first time, it locks on that particular satellite. After obtaining a lock on three unique satellites (in2-Dimplementation), the host calculates its position. The localization continues with the flow of packets from these satellites. Mobility is the only aspect of the satellite that led us to choose the open source satellite simulator (CNI OS3) for GNSSim design and implementation. Two types of mobility, SatSGP4, and FishEyeSatSGP4, have been implemented in this simulator. While FishEyeSatSGP4 is used for a fish-eye view simulation, SatSGP4 is used for regular flat-earth simulation. SatSGP4 is the standard satellite mobility protocol, and it defines the movement of all terrestrial satellites. Various parameters related to mobility are fetched from a TLE data file of that particular satellite system. The current TLE file being used is for GPS constellation and contains TLE data for 31 satellites.
Velocity in simulation.
The map pixels have been considered as the position (coordinates) of the satellites and hosts. The scaling of the two-dimensional (2D) background map, with respect to the earth, has been done using the radius of the earth (6371 km). The map has a dimension of 1080 m 3 2160 m. After scaling, each meter (or pixel) on the map corresponds to 1/ (18.5 3 103). Different UAV models available today have different speeds depending upon their design and usage. On average, a speed of 250 km/h (69.5 m/s) could be reached by a high-end military UAV, resulting in a speed of 69.5/ (18.5 3 103) = 0.0037 m/s on the simulation map. This is the speed we use for all simulations. Thus, a speed of 0.0075 m/s on the map would correspond to a speed of 500 km/h in the real world.
Attack library
Based on the classification of various threats and possible attacks on UAVs, we initially implemented two attacks in our previous work,namely, Continuous Jamming and a Single Target DDoS attack. 23 GPS Jamming and GPS spoofing are the latest additions to this library of cyberattacks. Their anatomy and implementation have been briefly discussed here. Results related to these attacks are presented in the next section. GPS jamming is an important and well-known attack that affects the availability of a GPS navigation signal and causes the receiver to fail to receive these weak signals. GPS jamming involves the transmission of high-power noise signals to render GPS receivers in the area non-functional. Several anti-jamming techniques have been proposed, to prevent narrow band interference, wide-band interference, etc., but there is still no absolute solution to this problem. Specifically for GPS jamming, it becomes much more difficult to prevent jamming, due to weak nature of satellite-based GPS signals. It is illegal to jam these signals within the USA. 31 3.3.1 Implementation. We implemented this attack using a large number of attack hosts that roam around in the simulation area and keep transmitting a noise signal with a high data rate and power to jam the GPS L1 frequency. Jammer implementation in our test bed was abstracted through the use of several hosts to block this frequency. Clearly, to jam all communication frequencies, the number of attack hosts required will be quite large because each host can only transmit at a particular frequency. Therefore, it was relatively easier to jam GPS signals because of their specific frequency.
3.3.2 GPS spoofing. One of the most harmful attacks for GPS devices, GPS spoofing aims at spoofing GPS signals to give a false sense of accurate physical location and results in mission path diversion. It is nowadays comparatively easier to launch such an attack due to the availability of off-the-shelf GPS signal generators. Satellite constellation preservation and signal transmission precision are of utmost importance in such an attack so that spoofing is not detected. As mentioned earlier, this has been demonstrated by several researchers in the real world with off-the-shelf equipment. [27] [28] [29] [30] 3.3.3 Implementation. We implemented it using a spoofed GPS signal generator, which is, in fact, another UAV at double the altitude of the UAV being attacked. Due to the public nature of GPS implementation details, building such a generator would be quite easy. Recently, a few GPS anti-spoofing mechanisms have been developed that are based on the detection of genuine GPS signals. In these techniques, genuine GPS signals are detected using directional antennas to detect the direction of signals. 32, 33 Based on these findings, we have set the attacking host at a higher altitude, to mislead the directional antennae that are installed on the victim UAV. The attacking host maintains the same the angle and distance with the victim host at all times so that these specialized GPS anti-spoofing directional antennas installed on the victim UAVs do not detect an ongoing spoofing attack.
Constraints and assumptions
Various constraints and assumptions made during the development of GPS in UAVSim include the following.
Generic computing environment: the project was not supported or funded as part of any grant and, therefore, state-of-the-art high-performance computing infrastructure could not be purchased. As a result, the medium-end computing systems (servers) already available as part of the university's computing infrastructure were used. System information and validation data non-availability: most of the system information is not available in the public domain and, thus, gathering various network and communication-related information posed a major challenge. Distance measurement: instead of calculating the distance between the satellite and the host through the speed of light and the time difference in transmission and reception, it is sent within the packet itself. The reason for this is that the limitation of OMNeT++ of Tx/Rx event timing is the same (accurate up to a nanosecond) to make it appear real time. Trilateration: we have approximated the implementation to a 2D localization (trilateration) instead of a 3D localization (multi-lateration). This is due to the limitation posed by the underlying simulation engine of OMNeT++. Attacker capability: the capability of attackers has been assumed to be equal or more than the UAVs in simulations. This enables the impact evaluation of more powerful adversaries as well as when our systems are compromised. Radio disturbances: the communication environment of the simulation test bed takes into consideration disturbances caused by random noise, upper layers of the atmosphere, and communication signals present in the lower layers.
Attack results and analysis
This section presents various results for GPS-related attacks implemented in the test bed. The UAV path is important for GPS spoofing attacks and, therefore, two types of mobility models, circle and linear, have been used to demonstrate various possible variations in the UAV path. This was achieved through the introduction of minor errors in position and distance values being sent in the spoofed GPS signal generator frame. For GPS jamming attacks, we only used linear mobility. In all cases, the speed on the map was 0.0037 m/s. As mentioned earlier, this corresponds to a speed of 250 km/h in the real world. Other default parameters for satellites and UAV hosts are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
GPS jamming
As mentioned earlier, a GPS jamming attack was implemented in our test bed by using various attack hosts to jam the GPS L1 frequency in different geographical areas. Therefore, it is understood that the number of attacks the hosts required to jam the GPS for a certain area would depend on the size of that area. Partial blockage of a frequency range will occur if we are trying to jam a broader frequency range and, thus, lessen packet loss for those frequencies. For a GPS jamming attack, we used 10 UAV hosts roaming on the map in an area of 1080 3 2160 m 2 . Attack hosts roam in the area as well, transmitting noise signals without any knowledge of UAVs in that area. This specific scenario makes it more real. We varied the number of attack hosts from 0 to 20 to check the behavior of the network. Finally, average percentage packet loss was calculated for these 10 hosts for each case. The plotted result is shown in Figure 2 . As expected, the loss increases with increasing number of attack hosts. Some of the lower losses may represent the unknown movement of the UAVs and attack hosts in certain areas.
GPS spoofing
Simulation results related to GPS spoofing are presented in this section. This section presents resultant effects of a GPS spoofing attack on an UAV when the vehicle was moving in a linear path. We used a single UAV and a single attack host to launch the attack. Four cases have been evaluated, based on the parameters in which the discrepancy was introduced. As mentioned before, we have satellite ID, x, y, and distance values in each GPS packet. Three cases of discrepancy are involved in each one of them (except satellite ID), while case IV analyzes discrepancy in all three parameters.
4.3.1
Case I: discrepancy in the X-direction. In this case, we vary the X-value and keep the discrepancy increasing, using the following expression:
where s is initialized as 0 and incremented by 1 in each new packet generated. Figure 3 shows the results of this experiment. As seen in the figure, the original southwesterly direction of the UAV is quite different from the spoofed westerly direction. This shows an increase in calculated Y-values and a decrease in calculated X-values.
4.3.2
Case II: discrepancy in the Y-direction. In this case, we vary the Y-value and keep the discrepancy increasing using following the expression:
where s is initialized as 0 and incremented by 1 in each new packet generated. Figure 4 shows the result of this experiment. As seen in the figure, the (almost) west direction of the UAV is the actual path, while spoofed GPS makes the UAV think that it is going in the northwest direction. This shows a huge decrease in Y-values and a very minimal impact on X-values, comparatively. Clearly, this angle of variation will increase if we increase the discrepancy factor of 0.005.
4.3.3
Case III: discrepancy in the X-and Y-directions. In this case, we vary the Y-value and keep the discrepancy increasing using the similar expressions of Cases I and II. Figure 5 shows the result of this experiment. As seen in the figure, the UAV thinks that it is moving almost reverse to its actual direction. This shows that both X-and Y-values are now increasing very rapidly.
4.3.4
Case IV: discrepancy in the X-and Y-directions and distance. In this case, a similar expression is used to introduce a discrepancy in all three variables of x, y, and the distance. Figure 6 shows the result of this experiment. Such discrepancy introduction shows that the spoofed path is similar to the one obtained when the discrepancy was introduced only in the Y-values. This indicates that discrepancy in distance values negates the effect of discrepancy in the X-values.
Effect of GPS spoofing on the circular path.
In the second set of experiments, the GPS spoofing attack was carried out on a host moving in a circular path. Its initial position can be anywhere on the circular path with a center and a radius. We randomly selected a radius of 1 m, with the center at (561 m, 432 m) on the map. The starting position was selected randomly to introduce randomness of the UAV position and see if the results were location independent. The attack host also moves in a circular path, with its starting position on a circular path of radius 2 m and center (565 m, 435 m). The attacks were designed considering different data broadcast from the attack host. Five cases, the different from linear path scenarios, were analyzed for this particular scenario. These are discussed below.
4.3.5.1
Case I: discrepancy in the X-direction. In this case, a discrepancy s is added to the X-values with a factor of 0.005 using the expression x = x+ (0.005 3 s), where s is initialized as 10 and incremented by 1 as each new packet is generated. Figure 7 shows the obtained result for this experiment. It is clear that there was a minor deviation of the host from its original circular path, and the host traverses almost the same original path.
4.3.5.2
Case II: higher discrepancy in the X-direction. Since increasing the discrepancy factor little by little was not resulting in tangible changes, we increased the discrepancy factor in the X-values by three times to 0.015 while keeping the Y-and distance values the same for this case. Similar to the case I, s was initialized as 10 and incremented by 1 as each new packet is generated. Figure 8 shows the results obtained for this case. As shown, the spoofed path is quite different from the original path and becomes linear starting from the initial starting point in the opposite direction.
4.3.5.3
Case III: positive discrepancy in the X-and Y-directions. In this case, we introduce positive discrepancy in both X-and Y-values using a similar expression as for Case I. The obtained results for this case are plotted in Figure 9 . As the figure indicates, the host is moving outward in a helical path with varying pitch, while believing that it is moving in a circular path. It should be noted that the variation is mostly increasing Y-values and thus results in a helical path.
4.3.5.4
Case IV: negative discrepancy in the X-and Y-directions. This case involves negative discrepancy introduction in both X-and Y-values using a similar expression as in Case I. The related results are shown in Figure 10 , which clearly shows that the host followed the original path approximately and then moved outward following a modified helical path. It should be noted that such a discrepancy results in large negative variations in both X-and Y-values.
4.3.5.5
Case V: positive discrepancy in the X-direction and negative discrepancy in the Y-direction. In this case, the discrepancy was added to the X-values and subtracted from the Y-values. Figure 11 shows the results obtained for this case. It can be seen that the host follows an inward helical path moving away from its original position. It is clear from the graph that this kind of discrepancy leads to lower positive variation in the Y-values but higher or almost 
Analysis
Through all these attack implementations, various results were obtained, and valuable insights were gained. Some of them are listed here.
Regarding GPS jamming attacks, the results were quite expected and variable and quite similar to real world jamming scenarios. As the number of attack hosts was increased, average GPS packet loss increased and reached up to 90%, which indicates successful jamming. Clearly, the UAV may go out of range of other UAVs, which would render the UAV unable to communicate with other UAVs. When discrepancy was introduced in only the Xvalues, it was noticed that different motion paths have different variations, which implies that the variations could not be generalized. Discrepancy factor variation results in variation of the spoofed path as well. In the case of a circular path, this increase led to a spoofed linear path compared to a spoofed circular path when the factor was lower. Thus, low discrepancy factors would be hard to detect and can make an UAV lock on it as a real satellite then increase the factor to cause path deviation. In general, it was noticed that variations in the Yvalues result in worse effects. In the case of the original linear path, the resultant deviations were huge, while in the case of the original circular path,Y-value discrepancies caused a resultant helical path, which could confuse the UAV and a correction made to correct its path may lead to a crash. In general, the spoofed paths are similar to the original paths regarding the class of curve, that is, spoofed paths for the original linear paths were linear, while for circular paths, they were curved paths. This would result in tougher detection of discrepancy or path deviation if the discrepancy factor is quite low.
Global Positioning System spoofing detection and mitigation
The most stringent requirement of the implementation of GPS in UAVs is the level of integrity of the position calculation and its impact on safety. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) can be defined as an algorithm that determines the integrity of the GNSS solution.
The RAIM algorithm compares the pseudo-range measurements among themselves to ensure that they are all consistent. 34 The basic flow of any RAIM algorithm would be to apply a fault detection mechanism on a computed set of navigation solution, isolate faulty satellites and provide mitigation-level computation so that availability is maintained. Since 3D position calculation requires data from four satellites, four visible satellites are not enough to provide integrity. If five visible satellites are chosen, and an anomaly is detected, then the position calculation from that satellite is discarded. The remaining four satellites are again not enough to compute the solution with different measurements and confirm that the solution is indeed correct. Therefore, the receiver can issue a warning, but it cannot provide integrity. With six or more satellites, the receiver can detect and mitigate the impact of a faulty satellite. 34 A similar concept has been applied in the GPS anti-spoofing algorithm (RAIM) designed by our team, where five satellites are used for detection and mitigation, based on our 2D implementation constraint. Figure 12 shows the process flow of the algorithm. It tries to detect the attack host or bad satellite through an anomaly detected in the positions calculated through the combination of five satellites that are grouped into three, and that mitigate the spoofing attack by releasing the lock from the identified faulty satellite or, in this case, attack the host.
RAIM

Explanation.
When the packets are received for the first time, there is no lock on the satellites. To implement RAIM, the original algorithm was modified to accept packets from five unique satellites instead of three. Once the packets are received, the RAIM algorithm is called to detect any attack host. The combination of these satellites, which will be 10, and the corresponding packet data are created, and the position of the host for each combination is calculated through the trilateration equations. Obviously, if the data in all packets are correct, the position of the host calculated by each combination of satellites should be approximately equal. If there is the slightest error in the data sent by the satellites, it can be identified up to two digits after the decimal, which can be ignored. After the threshold of the computational differences, discrepancy becomes apparent. So, one of the satellites in that combination must be an attack host. Other combinations are checked for the discrepancy, and the satellite that is common in all those combinations is identified as the attack host.
Once the attack host is identified, three out of four satellites are locked, and the host starts accepting packets from them. It is possible that the discrepancy in packets sent by the attack host will not be detected in the first attempt, and the host acquires a lock on it. The idea of the spoofing attack is to deviate the path of the host. So, the RAIM function is called again at certain intervals to check if the calculation was indeed correct. The next time RAIM is called, the discrepancy in the position calculated will obviously increase, it will be easily identifiable, and the mitigation technique can be implemented again. If from the results three or more satellites appear to be faulty, the lock is completely released, and a new set of satellites is selected that goes through the same detection and mitigation steps before the lock is acquired again.
Anti-spoofing simulation results and analysis
This section presents the results of anti-spoofing RAIM implementation on GPS spoofing attacks implemented in the paragraphs above. We have demonstrated the results of the RAIM algorithm on linear paths by introducing the discrepancy in the X-and Y-values of the coordinates. As discussed, RAIM was implemented at certain intervals to check for the attacked host and to mitigate any attack being carried out on the host. RAIM duration is a parameter that sets the time interval, after which RAIM will run again to check the consistency of the position calculated. Please note that the blue (dashed) line indicates the actual path, and the red (solid) line indicates the spoofed path, while the pink and green lines indicate the RAIM corrected path in Figures 13-22 . In addition, one unit on these graphs is about 9.25 km, and the speed of the UAV was 250 km/h.
Discrepancy in the X-direction
Firstly, the discrepancy was introduced in the X-values of the transmitted coordinates. The RAIM duration varied between 30 and 120 s, and it was observed that RAIM worked best when this interval of the consistency check was set at 90 s. Figures 13-17 show the obtained results for the X-value discrepancy introduction, detection, and correction for the durations, as mentioned above.
6.1.1 Case I: RAIM interval 30 s. Figure 13 shows the simulation results when the RAIM interval was set to 30 s. The figure clearly reflects that the attack could not be identified for the first run of the RAIM algorithm. However, after another 30 s, the attack was identified and the path was corrected. The little gap between the pink and green path indicates that the UAV has recovered from the spoofed attack. The authors also have a concern about such intervals, in that most of the time will be consumed in error checking and recalculating the position.
6.1.2 Case II: RAIM interval 45 s. Figure 14 shows the simulation result when the RAIM interval was set to 45 s. It shows the improvement in the correction of the spoofed path. The distance (or time) taken by the RAIM algorithm to auto correct the position information is less than in the previous case, but it still needs the second round of RAIM check to detect the discrepancy accurately.
6.1.3 Case III: RAIM interval 60 s. When the RAIM duration is further increased to 60 s, as shown in the Figure 15 , the RAIM algorithm identifies and corrects the discrepancy in the spoofed path, but the distance after which it gets corrected was too large. Certainly, it can be noticed that it took only one checking to identify the discrepancy. 
17, we see the adverse effects on the RAIM operation.
Although the correction is accurate, it takes almost three times the distance than in the 90 s case to correct the path.
Discrepancy in the Y-direction
Next, a similar discrepancy was introduced in the Y-values of the transmitted coordinates. Similar to the previous experiment, we varied the RAIM duration from 30 to 120 s, and it was once again observed that RAIM works best when this interval of the consistency check is set at 90 s. Thus, the RAIM duration was used as 90 s for all other RAIM-related simulations. Also, once a comparison is made between the results for the X-value discrepancy and the Y-value discrepancy, it is notable that the correction works better for the Y-value discrepancies. At this point in time, our earlier analysis of a GPS spoofing attack should be revisited. According to those results, Y-value discrepancies were much worse compared to X-value discrepancies and, thus, should be easily detectable, which explains why the performance for RAIM is better for Y-value discrepancies. Figure 18 shows the simulation result when the duration is set for 30 s. It can be seen that the simulation result is correct and better than Case I for X-value discrepancy. Also, the correction to the spoofed path is visible in the first iteration of the algorithm itself as compared to the related case for the X-value. The only issue is that it takes a longer distance (or time) to make the correction. Figure 19 shows similar results for the case in which the RAIM duration is set to 45 s. There is a slight improvement in the result, however.
6.2.3
Case III: RAIM interval: 60 s. With the RAIM duration is set to 60 s, as shown in Figure 20 , the result showed a little improvement as compared to Case II.
6.2.4
Case IV: RAIM interval: 90 s. When the RAIM duration is set to 90 s, as shown in Figure 21 , the detection and correction algorithm result is further improved. We also see that recovery from the spoofed path is quicker than for the other cases. This is also true of Case IV for the X-value discrepancy.
6.2.5 Case V: RAIM interval: 120 s. As evident from Figure  22 , the performance for an interval of 120 s is much worse compared to other scenarios. The distance/time it takes to correct its location and navigation is almost three times that of the best case obtained for the RAIM duration of 90 s.
Conclusion and future work 7.1 Conclusion
This paper presents a novel GPS spoofing attack detection and mitigation technique. Addressing the challenge of secure and accurate navigation is a very high priority in the field of UAV security research. We present details of the implementation of the GPS simulator as a newly added module in the open source UAV simulator UAVSim. The implementation and the related results of two GPS related attacks, GPS spoofing and GPS jamming, were also presented, including a detailed anatomy analysis of the obtained results along with important insights. The presented simulation test bed can be used for UAV-related security testing and implementation of other communication-related attacks and their mitigation techniques. Even with few limitations of the base simulation engine and a 2D localization implementation, the results obtained were quite promising and insightful. For RAIM implementation, it was noted that the higher the discrepancy, the easier it was to detect the error introduction more quickly. Further, a RAIM consistency check duration of 90 s worked best for various simulation experiments and was able to correct the path within a few kilometers. Another implementation of RAIM could not be found in the literature and, thus, we could not compare it with any existing results.
Future work
In future work, various mitigation techniques can be implemented for currently available attacks in the attack library. Although the impact of a few attacks on UAV communication, such as DDoS and jamming, have already been presented, more complicated attacks are yet to be implemented in this framework. We are currently working in similar directions, along with designing mitigation techniques. The design of more UAV models for inclusion in the UAV models library and the design of more attacks for inclusion in the attack library also pose challenges and are potential future work. Further improvement of the RAIM algorithm for better and quicker detection as well as correction can also be undertaken as future work.
